In his main opinion, Justice Masih concluded that the personal law provision under the 1986 Act and the secular remedy under CrPC Section 125 must co-exist in parallel in their distinct domains. The 1986 Act makes it the Muslim husband's obligation to provide for his divorced wife and children, while CrPC may be invoked by a woman unable to maintain herself. The two frameworks complement rather than replace each other.

The Supreme Court bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Augustine George Masih held that the codification of a Muslim woman's rights under the 1986 Act — including maintenance during the Iddat period, provision for a dignified life until remarriage, and return of Mehr and dowry — is additional to, and not in derogation of, her right to seek maintenance under secular provisions like Section 125 CrPC.

The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 was enacted in response to the Shah Bano case (1985), which had allowed a divorced Muslim woman to seek maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. The 1986 Act is seen as having undermined secular principles by seeking to nullify the Court's judgment. A Constitution Bench in 2001 upheld the 1986 Act but stopped short of declaring its provisions unconstitutional for discriminating against Muslim women.

The landmark ruling that Section 125 CrPC is a secular provision applicable to all irrespective of religion was delivered in Mohd. Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, 1985. In response, Parliament enacted the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, to protect rights of divorced Muslim women. Sayeed Khan Faujdar Khan v. Zaheba Begum (2006) subsequently applied this principle. Note: If the question intends the original landmark holding, the answer should be the Shah Bano case (1985) rather than the 2006 case.